Separate Punishment For Both Domestic Violence And Simple Assault Violate PC 654

People v. Trammel (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2023, No. A166756) 2023 WL 8060573, at *1

Summary: Trammel challenged the trial court’s sentence of an aggregate 12-year prison term for numerous convictions arising out of his violent relationship with his former girlfriend. The Court of Appeal agreed with Trammel that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654 and remanded the matter for a full resentencing. (People v. Trammel (June 30, 2022, A161381) 2022 WL 2353314 [nonpub. opn.].

On remand, the trial court corrected its section 654 errors, resentencing Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months. In this second appeal, Trammel argues that his new sentence violates the  prohibition against double jeopardy set forth in Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal agreed and remanded to correct this error and an  error with respect to custody credits.

In remanding the case, the court rejected Trammel’s request to have another full resentencing hearing before a different trial judge.

Trial court sentence

Trammel was sentenced to a total of 12 years in state prison in November 2020. Specifically, the trial court ordered: the upper term of eight years for the principal count, kidnapping (count XI); a consecutive 16 months for burglary (count I), a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats (count II); and a consecutive two years for the June 2017 domestic violence conviction (count VII), one year for the conviction, itself, and an additional year on the arming enhancement. The trial court imposed concurrent three-year terms for the remaining domestic violence convictions (counts IX and XII) and concurrent time-served sentences for the remaining misdemeanors (counts V, VIII, X, and XIII). (People v. Trammel, supra, A161381.)

The trial court erred under section 654 by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence under count VII and simple assault under count VIII, both of which related to the same June 2017 domestic violence incident. We also found that section 654 precluded punishment for both domestic violence under count IX and simple assault under count X with respect to the domestic violence incident on October 18, 2019. We remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v. Trammel, supra, A161381.)

On November 23, 2022, the trial court conducted a full resentencing, applying the new sentencing laws effective on January 1, 2022, were applicable to Trammel’s case. The court reviewed the presentence report, a resentencing memorandum from the prosecutor and a resentencing memorandum from the defense, which included a social worker’s mitigation assessment.

The trial court resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months in prison. Specifically, the court again ordered the upper term of eight years for the principal count, kidnapping (count XI); a consecutive 16 months for burglary (count I); and a consecutive two years for the June 2017 domestic violence conviction (count VII), one year for the conviction and an additional year on the attached arming enhancement. The court stayed the punishment for making criminal threats (count II (eight months)) and for the misdemeanors (counts V (1 year), VIII (180 days), X (180 days), and XIII (180 days) pursuant to section 654. Finally, rather than imposing concurrent three-year terms for the remaining domestic violence convictions (counts IX and XII), the trial court imposed a consecutive one-year term on count IX and a concurrent one-year term on count XII.

The trial court indicated it had considered the mitigation report but determined that no evidence suggested childhood trauma was related to the commission of the crimes. It further found that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, noting that Trammel showed no remorse for the crimes. The court additionally concluded that the middle term was not appropriate given Trammel’s history of prior convictions (which the prosecutor established with certified records of conviction) in aggravation and no factors in mitigation. When defense counsel commented that the sentence was four months longer than the court had previously imposed, the court indicated its awareness of this fact.

Trammel again appealed.

The Court of Appeal did not see any reasonable likelihood that on remand this trial court would impose an aggregate term appreciably different than the maximum allowable 12 years. The Court exercised its authority to modify the judgment by making the term imposed on count IX run concurrently rather than consecutively, for a total aggregate term of 11 years, four months.

Both parties agreed that the amended abstract of judgment in this case failed to accurately reflect Trammel’s total custody credits at the time of resentencing.

[“Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.”]; see also People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103 [concluding that, at resentencing, the trial court must recalculate and credit the actual time the defendant had served prior to the modification].) The Court  instructed the trial court to include in its second amended abstract of judgment the actual total custody credits to which Trammel was entitled at the time of his resentencing.

The information provided on this website does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available on this site are for general informational purposes only.  Information on this website may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information.