San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Morgan (Cal., Feb. 26, 2026, No. S286493) 2026 WL 533311, at *1–2

Summary: During a confrontation with law enforcement, Morgan aimed a firearm at police officers, “racked” its slide, and pulled the trigger. The weapon did not discharge and when officers eventually recovered it, it was unloaded. Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer by “the use of force or violence” under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a).  On appeal of his conviction, he argues  that assault (§ 240) is a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Because there was no evidence the weapon was loaded, he could not be convicted of assault and therefore could not be convicted of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a) (section 69(a)).

The California Supremd Court concluded that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Resisting  by force or violence does not require the “present ability” (§ 240) to commit a violent injury, an essential element of assault. s this interpretation.

People v. Zapata (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 10, 2026, No. D084024) 2026 WL 366837, at *1

Summary: A “Perkins operation” is when an undercover operative is placed in a cell with the suspect to obtain information from the suspect. The term derives its name from Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (Perkins).

During a Perkins operation, Zapata admitted to two undercover officers that he murdered Justin Triplett. A jury who heard a recording of Zapata’s confession convicted Zapata of second degree murder. On appeal, Zapata argues the trial court’s admission of his statements violated Miranda because he had invoked his right to an attorney, he did not waive that right when he spoke with the undercover agents, and the involvement of a known law enforcement officer transformed the operation into a custodial interrogation. The Court of Appeal agreed.

People v. Heaps (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 2026, No. B329296) 2026 WL 266465, at *1–4

Summary: The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies in state criminal trials. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.) That right is violated when a judge communicates with a jury during deliberations “without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69. (Hawthorne).)

Here, the trial court judge sent the judicial assistant, (the JA), into the jury room to speak to the jury about the foreperson’s (Juror No. 4’s) note describing the jurors’ collective concern that a juror (Juror No. 15) did not speak English sufficiently to deliberate and had already made up his mind (the Note). The trial judge did not inquire of the jury or inform trial counsel of the Note’s existence. The JA’s conversations about the Note with the jury were not transcribed.

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; HAILEY MORGAN LASHELLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 9, 2026, No. E086512) 2026 WL 73966, at *1–4

Summary: Lashelle (defendant) was charged by Petitioner Riverside County District Attorney’s office (the People) with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b).) Lashelle  filed a motion to dismiss arguing that she was denied her right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant contributed to any delay by failing to appear per her signed promises to appear.

Lashelle filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking review with the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court (Appellate Division). A divided panel of the Appellate Division concluded that the People’s failure to file a formal misdemeanor complaint within 25 days of defendant’s citation as specified in Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed and automatically relieved defendant of any obligation to appear. The Appellate Division ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and to reconsider defendant’s motion consistent with the Appellate Division’s conclusion.

People v. Aguilar (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 2, 2026, No. D083172) 2026 WL 17897, at *1

Summary: Aguilar was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses for his involvement in a shootout with San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers. Before trial, the People exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror who the prosecutor thought was unable to grasp the concept of intent. Aguilar objected on the ground that the People were trying to exclude Latinas, Latinos, and persons of Hispanic ethnicity from the jury. The court adopted the People’s rationale for the challenge as a finding of fact and overruled the defendant’s objection.

Aguilar appealed claiming that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed. There is no evidence that this juror was confused about intent and in fact shows that she understood the concept and appropriately answered the prosecutor’s questions. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

APRIL D. MYRES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Respondent. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 26, 2025, No. A170516) 2025 WL 3731539, at *1

Summary: The Public Employees Pension Reform Act (PEPRA; Gov. Code, § 7522 et seq.; Stats. 2012, ch. 296, § 15), enacted section 7522.72, under which a public employee forfeits part of their pension upon conviction of a felony “for conduct arising out of or in the performance of [their] official duties.” (§ 7522.72(b)(1)).) The Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) decided that it covered the conduct for which a federal jury found former San Francisco Deputy Sheriff April Myres guilty of mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). The trial court denied Myres’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The Court of Appeal held that while her criminal conduct related in some ways to her position, it did not “aris[e] out of or in the performance of … her official duties” (§ 7522.72(b)(1)). More than conduct that is only  “job related” is required.  That view ignores the statute’s text and has no support in precedent. The Court reversed.

Background of Deputy Myles Legal Problems