San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Zapata (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 10, 2026, No. D084024) 2026 WL 366837, at *1

Summary: A “Perkins operation” is when an undercover operative is placed in a cell with the suspect to obtain information from the suspect. The term derives its name from Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (Perkins).

During a Perkins operation, Zapata admitted to two undercover officers that he murdered Justin Triplett. A jury who heard a recording of Zapata’s confession convicted Zapata of second degree murder. On appeal, Zapata argues the trial court’s admission of his statements violated Miranda because he had invoked his right to an attorney, he did not waive that right when he spoke with the undercover agents, and the involvement of a known law enforcement officer transformed the operation into a custodial interrogation. The Court of Appeal agreed.

People v. Heaps (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 2026, No. B329296) 2026 WL 266465, at *1–4

Summary: The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies in state criminal trials. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.) That right is violated when a judge communicates with a jury during deliberations “without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69. (Hawthorne).)

Here, the trial court judge sent the judicial assistant, (the JA), into the jury room to speak to the jury about the foreperson’s (Juror No. 4’s) note describing the jurors’ collective concern that a juror (Juror No. 15) did not speak English sufficiently to deliberate and had already made up his mind (the Note). The trial judge did not inquire of the jury or inform trial counsel of the Note’s existence. The JA’s conversations about the Note with the jury were not transcribed.

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; HAILEY MORGAN LASHELLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 9, 2026, No. E086512) 2026 WL 73966, at *1–4

Summary: Lashelle (defendant) was charged by Petitioner Riverside County District Attorney’s office (the People) with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b).) Lashelle  filed a motion to dismiss arguing that she was denied her right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant contributed to any delay by failing to appear per her signed promises to appear.

Lashelle filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking review with the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court (Appellate Division). A divided panel of the Appellate Division concluded that the People’s failure to file a formal misdemeanor complaint within 25 days of defendant’s citation as specified in Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed and automatically relieved defendant of any obligation to appear. The Appellate Division ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and to reconsider defendant’s motion consistent with the Appellate Division’s conclusion.

People v. Aguilar (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 2, 2026, No. D083172) 2026 WL 17897, at *1

Summary: Aguilar was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses for his involvement in a shootout with San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers. Before trial, the People exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror who the prosecutor thought was unable to grasp the concept of intent. Aguilar objected on the ground that the People were trying to exclude Latinas, Latinos, and persons of Hispanic ethnicity from the jury. The court adopted the People’s rationale for the challenge as a finding of fact and overruled the defendant’s objection.

Aguilar appealed claiming that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed. There is no evidence that this juror was confused about intent and in fact shows that she understood the concept and appropriately answered the prosecutor’s questions. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

APRIL D. MYRES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Respondent. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 26, 2025, No. A170516) 2025 WL 3731539, at *1

Summary: The Public Employees Pension Reform Act (PEPRA; Gov. Code, § 7522 et seq.; Stats. 2012, ch. 296, § 15), enacted section 7522.72, under which a public employee forfeits part of their pension upon conviction of a felony “for conduct arising out of or in the performance of [their] official duties.” (§ 7522.72(b)(1)).) The Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) decided that it covered the conduct for which a federal jury found former San Francisco Deputy Sheriff April Myres guilty of mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). The trial court denied Myres’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The Court of Appeal held that while her criminal conduct related in some ways to her position, it did not “aris[e] out of or in the performance of … her official duties” (§ 7522.72(b)(1)). More than conduct that is only  “job related” is required.  That view ignores the statute’s text and has no support in precedent. The Court reversed.

Background of Deputy Myles Legal Problems

People v. Cabalar (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 16, 2025, No. G065108) 2025 WL 3640515, at *1–2

Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 creates a mental health diversion program has put in place a pretrial means of getting individuals mental health treatment and resources that meet their needs in order to reduce recidivism and advance public safety. Cabalar appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion for mental health diversion. The court found he met all statutory eligibility and suitability criteria but exercised “residual discretion” to deny the motion based on public safety concerns and a perceived inability of courts to monitor individuals during the period of diversion.

Cabalar argues the trial court had no authority to deny diversion once it concluded he met the statutorily specified eligibility and suitability criteria. He also contends the court abused its discretion by relying on matters inconsistent with the purposes of the mental health diversion statute and an incorrect statement about court oversight during diversion. Although a grant of diversion is discretionary even if a defendant meets all eligibility and suitability criteria specified in the statute: a court’s discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the legislation, which includes having mental health diversion apply as broadly as possible. In this case denial of diversion was based on findings unsupported by substantial evidence, matters inconsistent with legislative policy and purpose, and a misunderstanding of a characteristic of the diversion program. Here, the denial of diversion was an abuse of discretion. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions that, absent any evidence of changed circumstances since the original denial that affect Cabalar’s eligibility or suitability for diversion, the court grant his diversion motion.

Kuhnel v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 17, 2025, No. A163307) 2025 WL 3652126, at *1–2

Summary: Kuhnel seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to terminate her probation on the ground she is entitled to the retroactive benefit of a statutory amendment reducing the length of probationary terms. Formerly, the law generally allowed a court to place a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor on probation for up to three years. (Pen. Code, former § 1203a.) Effective January 1, 2021, this default period was reduced to one year. (Pen. Code, § 1203a.) The California Supreme Court held that because Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to cases that are not yet final, it reduces the length of probationary terms imposed before the new law went into effect and authorizes relief from the consequences of a probationer’s acts committed beyond the new maximum period. (People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 205, 210–211 (Faial).)

Kuhnel was originally placed on three years’ probation and allegedly violated its terms during the first year of her probation. The court responded by summarily revoking probation, but not until early in the second year. These events all occurred well before Assembly Bill 1950 was enacted or went into effect, and they were appropriate under then-governing law. (See § 1203.3, subd. (a).) The issue is whether the rule of retroactivity prevents the court from adjudicating the violation, alleged to have occurred during the period when probation was unquestionably proper, on the ground that probation was not summarily revoked until after the maximum probationary period allowed under Assembly Bill 1950.