San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

In a death penalty case, the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excused at least four prospective jurors for cause and reversed the defendant’s death sentence while affirming his conviction. In a capital case, the erroneous excusal of even one prospective juror for cause requires automatic reversal of the death sentence, although not the guilt determinations. Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510. A jury in Los Angeles convicted defendant for kidnapping, robbing, raping, torturing, and murdering a 45-year-old woman and returned a death verdict.  The prosecutor also struck four black male jurors, leaving no black man on the jury.

Defendant Jamelle Edward Armstrong, a black man, was sentenced to death for raping, torturing, and murdering Penny Sigler, a white woman. Armstrong objected to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of four black men in the jury panel. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. The prosecutor gave reasons for each strike, and the trial court rejected Armstrong’s Batson claims.

Trial Court applied erroneous standard to juror qualification for death penalty

The California Court of Appeal held that the prosecution in this case was not required to grant use immunity to a prosecution witness who invoked his right of self-incrimination at trial instead of introducing the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony under the provisions of Evidence Code section 1291.1, the hearsay and confrontation clause exception for former testimony.

Appealing a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, the defendant contended that:

(1) the trial court erred in admitting at trial prosecution witness’s preliminary hearing testimony after he invoked the right to remain silent because the defense did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about a prior criminal conviction not disclosed by the prosecution until after the preliminary hearing or about alleged threats made to defendant’s wife the day after defendant’s arrest;

Here are some of the significant changes to Criminal Laws in 2019.

Post-conviction Discovery

• Under existing PC 1054.9, a person sentenced to death or LWOP is entitled to post-conviction discovery to file a habeas or motion to vacate judgment. Amendments expand this right to defendants sentenced to:any case in which a defendant is convicted of a serious or violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or more.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s sanctions imposed on a San Francisco Public Defender for failing to provide the prosecution with the name and statements taken from a witness called by the co-defendant’s lawyer.  The Public Defender asserted that the trial judge improperly imposed a $950 sanction on him because he never intended to call the witness at trial and did not call the witness. The defense strategy was not to put on an affirmative defense but to create reasonable doubt of his client’s guilt through cross examination of the witnesses called by the co-defendant’s lawyer and the District Attorney. The decision clarifies the limits of the defense’s reciprocal discovery obligation in criminal cases. This was the first case to address whether a criminal defense lawyer in a multi-defendant case has duty to disclose a witness he claims he does not intend to call, but reasonably anticipates a codefendant is likely to call. (People v. Landers, A145037; 1/14/19; C/A 1st, Div.4)

Reciprocal Discovery in Criminal Case

Reciprocal Discovery in criminal cases was added to the Penal Code by Proposition 115 in 1990 and may be found at Penal Code, part 2, title 6, chapter 10 (§ 1054 et seq.) (Chapter 10). “The purpose of [Chapter 10] is to promote ascertainment of truth by liberal discovery rules which allow parties to obtain information in order to prepare their cases and reduce the chance of surprise at trial. Reciprocal discovery is intended to protect the public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the People’s interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments based on incomplete testimony.” (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1201