San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

In re Hoze (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 25, 2021, No. A158399) 2021 WL 732072, at *1

Summary: Johnnie Hoze was 67 years old and had served nearly four decades in state prison on an indeterminate life sentence when the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) found him suitable for parole under the Elderly Parole Program (Pen. Code, § 3055). Before he could be released, however, the Board determined that Hoze must serve additional sentences for two offenses he committed in prison, consistent with ssection 1170.1(c).  Hoze filed a habeas corpus petition alleging he was entitled to immediate release under the Elderly Parole Program. The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeal  agreed with the trial court: Hoze is not required to serve his sentences for in-prison offenses because a grant of parole under section 3055 supersedes section 1170.1(c).

Facts:

People v. Clements (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 4, 2021, No. E073965) 2021 WL 388834, at *1

Summary: In 1989, Jody Ann Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16-year-old brother who then two killed the brother by stabbing him and bludgeoning him with a rock.  A jury convicted Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder.

In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437), which amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Pen. Code, §§ 188, subd. (a)(3); 189, subd. (a)) The Legislature also added a new provision to the Penal Code, which establishes a procedure for vacating murder convictions if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. (§ 1170.95; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

People v. Collins (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 2021, No. F076883) 2021 WL 343935

 Summary: Collins was convicted of two counts of murder as a result of driving while impaired

On appeal, he claims that  the trial court erred in denying his motion to challenge the prosecutor’s excusal of a black prospective juror during jury selection.

In re Palmer (Cal., Jan. 28, 2021, No. S256149) 2021 WL 279621, at *1

 
Summary: The California and federal Constitutions bar the infliction of punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offender’s individual culpability. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) The courts, “as coequal guardian[s] of the Constitution, (are) to condemn any violation of that prohibition.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 (Lynch).) When an inmate claims a sentence is excessive because of one or more parole denials is the question at the heart of this case.

William M. Palmer II first sought release on parole from the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) in 1995. Following the Board’s 10th denial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming  that the 30 years he had already served on a life sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was a juvenile was constitutionally excessive. Before the Court of Appeal could adjudicate the habeas petition, the Board found him suitable for parole and ordered him released. (In re Palmer (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1202–1203 (Palmer).) The Court of Appeal subsequently agreed with Palmer that his now-completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 1207–1222.) Because that term had already been served, however, the Court of Appeal focused its order of relief on a different target. The court reasoned that Palmer was “entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole supervision.” (Id. at p. 1224.)

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alberto Beto Hernandez, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 22, 2021, No. B302815) 2021 WL 221976, at *1–2

Summary: On January 1, 2019 the the law governing whether a defendant can be convicted of murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory was changed. The Legislature enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3),1 which provides that, (except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e)), to be convicted of murder a defendant must act with malice and that malice may not be imputed based solely on participation in a crime.

Section 189, subdivision (e), is an exception to the malice requirement for murder,  stating that an individual can be liable for first degree felony murder if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) acted with the intent to kill in aiding and abetting the actual killer, or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Favor v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 13, 2021, No. E075340) 2021 WL 118005 

Summary: The right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment “is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 189.)

Here, Favor agreed to a limited waiver of this right and consented to a new deadline that was 76 days after arraignment. The preliminary hearing was not held by that date, so Favor moved for mandatory dismissal under Penal Code section 859b. The People argue that there can be no limited waiver of the 60-day deadline, so Favor’s waiver was a general one that allowed the preliminary hearing to be set later than he authorized, even without a further waiver.