San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Brewer (Cal. Ct. App., June 7, 2021, No. C089676) 2021 WL 2309551

 Summary:  Brewer  was convicted of second degree robbery, attempted second degree robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm, and sentenced to a determinate term of 63 years. Brewer appealed and contended that  his sentence, which he characterized as the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole imposed on a developmentally disabled person, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17, of the California Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held that:

People v. Esquivel (Cal., June 17, 2021, No. S262551) 2021 WL 2461206, at *1–2

Summary: The California Supreme Court held that the judgment is not final in a  case where defendant is placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of an order revoking probation and imposing sentence. (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25 (McKenzie).)

Therefore, the  Estrada Presumption, that new legislation reducing the punishment for an offense, is  presumed to apply to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (Estrada) applies to cases when a defendant is placed on probation with a suspended sentence that may be appealed if probation is revoked.

 People v. Tousant (Cal. Ct. App., May 26, 2021, No. A156044) 2021 WL 2134389

 Summary: Tousant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence downloaded from his cellphone, seized after an allegedly illegal search of his car left at the scene of an Oakland shooting. Tousant claimed the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained after the Oakland shooting and in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.

Warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable

People v. Houle (Cal. Ct. App., May 18, 2021, No. A159055) 2021 WL 1975277, at *1–5

Summary: Defendant was sentenced to a stipulated six-year prison term after a plea bargain where he pleaded no contest to one count of unlawfully possessing a concealed dirk or dagger pursuant to Penal Code section 21310;1 admitted having a prior strike within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c); and serving two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).

At the time he was sentenced, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required a one-year enhancement for each prior prison term served for “any felony.”

People v. Fortman (Cal. Ct. App., May 13, 2021, No. B304567) 2021 WL 1920356, at *1

Summary: A murder conviction that may rest on a theory of vicarious liability later invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437  must stand if the prosecution proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conviction is valid under a still-viable theory of liability. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95, subds. (d)(3) & (a).)

Issue: Does this require the prosecution to convince the trial court hearing the petition to conclude that it would convict defendant on a still-viable theory, or merely to convince that court that a reasonable jury could convict defendant on a still-viable theory?

In re Murray (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 19, 2021, No. A161687) 2021 WL 1526490, at *1–5

 Summary Paul Murray was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole for a first degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. Murray sought a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, because he stated was eligible for a Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied his request because section 3051 expressly exclude LWOP offenders who were 18 years old or older at the time of their offense. Murray filed a habeas petition and argued that  section 3051 violates his constitutional right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders a youth offender parole hearing but denying such a hearing to youthful LWOP offenders. The Court of Appeal concluded that there is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context, and thus deny his petition.

Murray’s equal protection claim