Unparalleled Experience

Over three decades of work
as an attorney and police officer

Proven Results

Many cases dismissed or charges reduced

Unparalleled Experience - Proven Results
SF’s Top DMV Law Office
Thousands of
licenses saved
  • Negligent operator hearings
  • Excessive DMV points
  • Age discrimination
  • License re-examinations
SF’s Top DMV Law Office
DUI and Traffic Defense
  • Avoid jail and going to court
  • Save your license
  • Charge reductions
DUI and Traffic Defense
Criminal Defense
  • Hire a former police officer with a team of “top flight”
    private investigators and experts with law-enforcement
    backgrounds.
  • If you are innocent or have facts that have been ignored
    by the police, we can help!
Criminal Defense
Since 1985
San Francisco Traffic Law Clinic
  • SF’s largest and longest running traffic law firm
  • Experienced traffic attorney will handle your ticket for less
    than cost of the fine!
  • We successfully represent over 3000 cases annually
  • Special Internet discount: SF 1 point infraction only $99.00!
Since 1985 San Francisco Traffic Law Clinic

People v. Sup. Ct. (Espeso); BS 175803; 7/14/21; Los Angeles Superior Court App. Div. ruled no diversion for DUI

People v. Sup. Ct. (Diaz‑Armstrong); APR12100008; 7/27/21; Riverside Sup. Ct. App. Div.-ruled diversion available for DUI

There is a split on this question. The Riverside Superior Court appellate division says that 23640 does not bar diversion for a misdemeanor DUI.  

People v. Clark (Cal. Ct. App., July 29, 2021, No. A158238) 2021 WL 3205435, at *1

Summary: Clark appealed and challenged the imposition of a monthly $100 probation supervision fee, following a violation of his probation while his  appeal was pending. Assembly Bill 1869 repealed the statute authorizing the probation supervision fee, Penal Code section 1203.1b.

Clark argued that he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Assembly Bill 1869, and  asked that  the court order vacatur of the fee imposed on him under section 1203.1b.

People v. Bryant (Cal., July 29, 2021, No. S259956) 2021 WL 3201079, at *1

Summary: The 2011 Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; Realignment Act or Act) provides for a period of mandatory supervision after a county jail sentence for eligible defendants. The California Supreme Court assessed the validity of a challenged condition of mandatory supervision  and concluded that discretionary conditions are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (Lent).

Facts: Bryant was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle.  (Pen. Code,1 § 25400, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(6).) The court imposed a split sentence (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)), of two years in the county jail, with the last 364 days to be served at large on mandatory supervision. Over Bryant’s objection, the court imposed the following condition: “Defendant is to submit to search of any electronic device either in his possession[,] including cell phone[,] and/or any device in his place of residence. Any search by probation is limited to defendant[’]s text messages, emails, and photos on such devices.”

People v. Lewis (Cal., July 26, 2021, No. S260598) 2021 WL 3137434, at *1

Summary: The California Supreme Court reviewed Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437) which eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (Pen. Code, §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as amended by Senate Bill 1437.) Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code,1 which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.

In this case, the court decided two issues.

People v. Schulz (Cal. Ct. App., July 20, 2021, No. F080978) 2021 WL 3047264, at *2–8

Summary: Schulz appealed  claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to reduce his felony convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol to misdemeanors pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).1 He also claims that under the Estrada presumption, he is entitled to relief under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) which amended section 1203.1, subdivision (a), to limit probation for felony offenses to no more than two years, subject to certain exceptions. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.)

The court ordered the parties to file supplemental letter briefs pursuant to Government Code section 68081, addressing whether, assuming Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively, defendant’s convictions for violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivisions (a) and (b), qualify for a reduction in the probationary period under section 1203.1, subdivision (a), given that subdivision (m) of section 1203.1, which was added by Assembly Bill No. 1950, excludes “an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.” (See Veh. Code, § 23600, subd. (b)(1) [“If any person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152 or 23153 and is granted probation, the terms and conditions of probation shall include … a period of probation not less than three nor more than five years ….”].

People v. Stewart (Cal. Ct. App., July 9, 2021, No. E074907) 2021 WL 2883176, at *1

Summary: Stewart was honorably discharged from the Army in 1976 and suffers from schizophrenia related to his military service. In 1986 and a1992, he was convicted of first degree burglary. In 2001, after being convicted on two counts of spousal battery, he was sentenced, as a third-striker, to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.

In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1170.911 to allow  convicted veterans who suffers from a specified disorder as a result of their military service to petition for resentencing, so that that disorder may be considered as a mitigating factor when imposing a determinate term.

In re Matthew W. (Cal. Ct. App., July 8, 2021, No. A159931) 2021 WL 2850407, at *1

Summary: Matthew W. appealed  from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, in which the court sustained an allegation of assault with a deadly weapon and placed him on probation.

On appeal, Matthew W. contended that  the jurisdictional findings must be reversed because the juvenile court improperly admitted defendant’s pre-arrest statements to police made during a custodial interrogation, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda).

People v. Kasrawi (Cal. Ct. App., June 16, 2021, No. D077139) 2021 WL 2451095

Summary: Kasrawi was stopped and ultimately arrested by a police officer who acted on no more than a hunch. The officer detained  Kasrawi after watching him  cross the street to his legally parked car. The officer later learned that Kasrawi had an outstanding arrest warrant. Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence need not be suppressed.

This case is an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies where a law enforcement officer discovers the defendant’s outstanding warrant after an illegal stop but before a search yields evidence of a crime. Under these limited circumstances, discovery of the warrant  attenuates the taint of the original detention.

People v. Williams (Cal. Ct. App., June 17, 2021, No. E074162) 2021 WL 2472953, at *1–4

 Summary: A trial court exercising its discretion pursuant to section 1170 of the Penal Code to recall a sentence and enter a reduced term must: (i) give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard ; and (ii) set forth the reasons for its choice of sentence.

Discretion to strike prior serious felony conviction in 2019

Corona v. Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct. App., June 21, 2021, No. A161369) 2021 WL 2525651, at *1

Summary: San Francisco police arrested Corona after he entered a freestanding garage located on the same property as a house. The People charged him with first degree burglary, which applies to the burglary of “an inhabited dwelling house.” (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a).)

Corona argued that an uninhabited outbuilding, such as a detached garage, is not an inhabited dwelling house. The Court of Appeal agreed and found  Corona’s position was consistent with the text and legislative history and over six decades of case law, and our Legislature’s acquiescence in longstanding precedent.

Contact Information