San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

In re TRAVIS LANELL MONTGOMERY on Habeas Corpus. (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 6, 2024, No. D083970) 2024 WL 4099744, at *1

Summary: Montgomery appealed an order denying a motion for discovery he made in connection with a postjudgment petition for writ of habeas corpus that sought relief for alleged violations of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA or Act). The Court concluded the order is not appealable and dismissed the appeal.

In 2008, a jury found Montgomery guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count each of robbery, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon; found true firearm and gang enhancement allegations; and found true Montgomery had two prior juvenile adjudications that constituted strikes under the “Three Strikes” law. The trial court sentenced Montgomery to prison for a term of 61 years to life that was later reduced to 26 years to life. (People v. Henderson (Oct. 5, 2010, D054493) [nonpub. opn.].)

People v. Ramirez (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 20, 2024, No. G063224) 2024 WL 3869450, at *1

Summary: Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “once a vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, a police officer may order the driver to exit the vehicle without any articulable justification.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872 (Hoyos), citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111, fn. 6 (Mimms).)

Here, two police officers on routine patrol when they stopped a car for a traffic violation. About three minutes into the stop, Booth ordered the driver, Ramirez, out of his car. As Ramirez was being removed from the car, Driscoll saw a handgun just behind the driver’s seat.

People v. Moore (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 9, 2024, No. A167918) 2024 WL 3754712, at *1–2

Summary: Moore pleaded no contest to the charge of stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a).  Moore appealed, challenging his permanent revocation of probation following his admission to a probation violation on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney’s failure to request pretrial mental health diversion (§ 1001.36). Moore was required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to pursue this appeal. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) The contrary holding in People v. Hill (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1190, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 has been implicitly abrogated by our Supreme Court in People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 308 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 529 P.3d 1116. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because Moore failed to obtain the requisite certificate of probable cause.

Background

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SCOTLANE McCUNE, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal., Aug. 8, 2024, No. S276303) 2024 WL 3736802, at *1–2

Summary: California law mandates that individuals who are convicted of a crime must be ordered to make full restitution to their victims “in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B); see Pen. Code, § 1202.4.) When a victim’s losses are not ascertainable at the time the defendant is sentenced, the sentencing court must issue a restitution order providing “that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) The court then “shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined.” (Id., § 1202.46.)

Here, McCune was placed on felony probation for five years and ordered at sentencing to pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. McCune’s probation period was shortened by new legislation capping felony probation at two years. The trial court then fixed the amount of victim restitution.  McCune argues the order came too late because, under the probation statute, the trial court’s authority to modify the order of probation ended once his term of probation had expired. (Pen. Code, § 1203.3.)

Snap, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., July 23, 2024, No. D083446) 2024 WL 3507024, at *1

Summary: This writ presented  a question of first impression that was raised but not decided by the California Supreme Court in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 267 Cal.Rptr.3d 267, 471 P.3d 383 (Touchstone): Whether the social media companies like Meta, Inc. (Meta) and Snap, Inc. (Snap), which access their customer’s data for their own business purposes, excludes them from the limitations imposed on the disclosure of information by the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., SCA or the Act). The Court concluded that the companies’ ability to access and use their customers’ information takes them outside the limitations of the Act.

Pina, real party in interest, was charged with the murder of his brother, Samuel, and the attempted murder of another man, and awaited trial on the charges. Pina’s defense counsel issued criminal defense subpoenas to Snap, the corporation which operates Snapchat, and Meta, the corporation that operates Facebook and Instagram, seeking social media posts and other communications made by Samuel on those platforms in the two years prior to his death. Pina sought this material because he believed it may contain information showing Samuel’s violent character.

People ex rel. Burns v. Wood (Cal. Ct. App., July 11, 2024, No. G061001) 2024 WL 3370029, at *1–2

Summary: The city of Fountain Valley (the City) sought to prohibit  Nancy Wood, an indigent homeless woman, from residing in the City’s Mile Square Park (the Park), which is near the hospital where she receives treatment for cancer and heart disease. The City had no homeless shelter at that time.

Procedural History: The City first filed a criminal complaint against Wood which entitled her to representation by appointed counsel. Wood conceded she was residing in the Park in violation of the City’s ordinance but argued necessity as a defense.

While that criminal case was pending, the same City attorneys who were prosecuting Wood criminally filed this civil lawsuit for nuisance against her. Because she was indigent and not entitled to appointed counsel, Wood defended herself against the same lawyers who were simultaneously prosecuting her criminally. The trial court was aware of this.

In the civil case, Wood again conceded her violation of the City’s ordinances and argued necessity as a defense. Due to COVID restrictions, all proceedings were conducted remotely.  Wood informed the court that she had not received the City’s trial exhibits, the court observed there was a record that the City had served her by mail (at a local soup kitchen). The court found Wood culpable for public nuisance because she was residing with her belongings in the Park, in violation of city ordinances. The court then waited five months before issuing its judgment prohibiting Wood from having her “illegal encampment”in the Park at any hour of the day, and from being in the Park during the hours it is closed to the public. Less than a week after the court entered its judgment, Wood was acquitted in the criminal nuisance case.

Wood argues the judgment should be reversed because the trial court failed to stay the civil action until after the City’s concurrent criminal prosecution of her was completed. Wood also argues the court erred by refusing to consider her evidence related to the same necessity defense she successfully relied on in the criminal case. Wood argues the City improperly sought punitive injunctive relief in this case, in violation of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition.

The Court of appeal held that trial court abused its discretion in failing to stay this case pending the outcome of Wood’s criminal case and reversed the judgment and remand the case with directions that the trial court reconsider the propriety of the injunction.

The trial court ignored the evidence supporting Wood’s defense of necessity in deciding to issue the injunction in this case. The decision to issue an injunction in a civil case involves an exercise of the court’s equitable jurisdiction and the court is therefore obligated to consider all relevant evidence. The circumstances supporting Wood’s claimed need to reside in the Park are relevant considerations for the trial court on that issue.

Public Nuisance Law

Civil Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as: “Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.” A nuisance may be a public nuisance, a private nuisance, or both.  A nuisance is public when it “affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.)

To be considered a nuisance per se the object, substance, activity or circumstance at issue must be expressly declared to be a nuisance by its very existence by some applicable law.

Conduct that qualifies as a public nuisance may be punishable criminally and enjoined civilly pursuant to the court’s equitable jurisdiction. (Civ. Code, § 3491; People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1108-1109 [“Acts or conduct which qualify as public nuisances are enjoinable as civil wrongs or prosecutable as criminal misdemeanors”].)

The issuance of an injunction is an exercise of the court’s equitable authority. The court must balance the interests of the two sides in deciding whether to grant such relief.

If the court issues an injunction to abate a public nuisance and the defendant does not comply, the government can enforce the injunction through a criminal action for contempt of court. If the defendant is found guilty of willful contempt, the consequences can include punishment such as fines and incarceration. A civil injunction can also be a vehicle for imposing criminal sanctions.
The Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Stay this Case

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Nicholas NEEDHAM, Petitioner, v.The SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. S276395; July 1, 2024; 2024 WL 3243077 (Cal.)

Summary: County district attorney filed petition to commit sex offender as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Offender filed motions to preclude People’s retained expert from testifying at trial. The Superior Court, Orange County, denied the motions. Offender filed petition for writ of mandate or prohibition to prevent People’s expert from conducting any further interviewing or testing and from testifying at trial. Fourth District Court of Appeal denied the petition. Supreme Court granted offender’s petition for review and transferred the matter to Court of Appeal with direction to issue order to show cause. Court of Appeal thereafter granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to exclude expert’s testimony. People’s petition for review was granted.

Holdings: The Supreme Court held that: