Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair

Andrew v. White (U.S., Jan. 21, 2025, No. 23-6573) 2025 WL 247502

Summary: Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, that Due Process Clause can in certain cases protect against introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence at criminal trials, was a “holding,” for purposes of federal habeas review of state court’s adjudication of merits of prisoner’s federal claim alleging that State introduced irrelevant evidence about her sex life and her failings as mother and wife.

Facts: An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband and sentenced her to death. At trial the State introduced evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant.  Andrew argued in a federal Habeas petition that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals denied the petition because it incorrectly believed that no holding of the Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. However, the Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

On appeal, Andrew argued that the introduction of irrelevant evidence, including evidence “that she had extramarital sexual affairs with two other men,” violated Oklahoma law as well as the Federal Due Process Clause. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) held that admission of evidence about Andrew’s extramarital affairs had been proper because it showed that “[h]er co-defendant was just the last in a long line of men that she seduced.” The OCCA “struggl[ed],” however, “to find any relevance … other than to show [Andrew’s] character” for the remaining challenged evidence. The State “agree[d] that most of this evidence was irrelevant to any issue in this case.” Ibid. The OCCA denied relief on the ground that the trial court’s errors had been harmless.

Federal Habeas Relief and Supreme Court Holdings

A federal court may grant habeas relief as to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts or unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). To show that a state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, a petitioner must show that the court unreasonably applied “ ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.’ ” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) An unreasonable application, in turn, is one with which no fair minded jurist would agree.

When the Supreme Court relies on a legal rule or principle to decide a case, that principle is a “holding” of the Court for purposes of AEDPA. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72, (2003) (“[C]learly established Federal law … is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision” Andrew properly identified clearly established federal law.

Prejudicial or misleading statements by prosecution

The Supreme Court had several times before held that prosecutors’ prejudicial or misleading statements violate due process if they render a trial or capital sentencing fundamentally unfair. By the time of the OCCA’s decision in this case, it was clear that the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence could, in certain cases, violate the Due Process Clause.

The Court of Appeals nonetheless held that Payne “merely established that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a ‘per se bar’ to the introduction of victim-impact statements in capital cases.” 62 F.4th at 1314 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597).  But Payne expressly relied on the availability of relief under the Due Process Clause to reach that conclusion. The Supreme Court has  applied Payne’s framework to a claim much like Andrew’s: “that the introduction of [prejudicial] evidence” at the sentencing phases “violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Due Process Clause … wards off the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that would render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 123, 136 S.Ct. 633, 193 L.Ed.2d 535 (2016) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597).

Clearly established law for purposes of AEDPA

General legal principles can constitute clearly established law for purposes of AEDPA so long as they are holdings of the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court has not previously relied on Payne to invalidate a conviction for improperly admitted prejudicial evidence, moreover, “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt.” White, 572 U.S. at 427. The Court of Appeals  erred by refusing even to consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied established due process principles to Andrew’s case.

Disposition

At the time of the OCCA’s decision, clearly established law provided that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, vacates the judgment below, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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