San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogDana Stubblefield’s conviction reversed because of Violation of Racial Justice Act
People v. Stubblefield (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 26, 2024, No. H048598) 2024 WL 5231745, at *1–2
Summary: A jury found Stubblefield guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment of Jane Doe, an intellectually disabled woman. The jury found he personally used a firearm in the commission of the first two offenses. The trial court sentenced Stubblefield to a term of 15 years to life in prison.
The prosecution alleged Stubblefield threatened Doe with a handgun while she was at his house. The police decided not to search Stubblefield’s house after Doe reported the incident, and no gun was introduced into evidence. In closing arguments, the prosecutor asserted the police made the decision not to search Stubblefield’s house based partly on the fact that he was a famous Black man. The prosecutor claimed a search would have created “a storm of controversy,” and added, “Can you imagine in Morgan Hill when they search an African-American –,” defense counsel objected. The trial court sustained the objection but gave the jury no admonishments with respect to this part of the prosecutor’s arguments.
Stubblefield contends the prosecution’s statements violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act, or RJA). Closing arguments began July 21, 2020—after protests and over the death of George Floyd. Stubblefield argues the prosecution appealed to racial bias by identifying his race as the reason for a weakness in the prosecution’s case and using the racially biased backlash against the protests. The Attorney General contends any violation was harmless error.
The Court of Appeal found the prosecutionsviolated the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code section 745). The prosecution argued that Stubblefield’s race was a factor in law enforcement’s decision not to search his house. The statement implied that Stubblefield gained an advantage at trial because he was a Black man. The prosecution also claimed that a search would “open up a storm of controversy” appealing to racially biased perceptions surrounding protests over George Floyd’s death. The prosecution’s statements constituted “racially discriminatory language about” Stubblefield’s race within the meaning of Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(2), and his conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a). Penal Code section 745, subdivision (e)(2)(A) precludes harmless error analysis of this violation and mandates a specific remedy: We are required to vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a). (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).)
The California Racial Justice Act
The Legislature passed the Racial Justice Act in 2020 ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ The RJA prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. [Citation.]
This case concerns the use of “racially discriminatory language” in violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(2). A violation has occurs under that subdivision if “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings … an attorney in the case … used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” “ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or coded language … or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) Subdivision (a)(2) does not apply “if the person speaking is relating language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
When judgment has been entered and a court finds “that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).)
Application of the Racial Justice Act to the Prosecution’s Statements
The text of section 745, subdivision (a)(2), defines the use of racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race to be a violation “whether or not purposeful.” (See also Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 829, 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 226 [holding “implicit bias is, by definition, unintentional and unconscious” in considering a claim raised under Section 745, subdivision (a)(1)].) The statute directs the “objective observer” to disregard whether the person using the discriminatory language intended for it to be discriminatory. It doesnot matter whether the speaker thought the language would be interpreted as discriminatory by anyone else who heard it.
Stubblefield contends the prosecution’s statements were a reference to the post-Floyd conflict. The Floyd killing and events is a fact of “generalized knowledge” so “universally known” that it could not “reasonably be the subject of dispute.” (See Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (f).) Stubblefield’s claim is evaluated with the assumption that a person listening to the prosecution’s statements would be aware of the post-Floyd conflict and concerns about the use of force by police in encounters with Black persons.
The Prosecution’s Statements Violated the Racial Justice Act
The prosecution identified Stubblefield’s race as a factor in law enforcement’s decision not to search his house. This argument defies any racially neutral interpretation.
The prosecution had no basis in the facts or evidence to assert that Stubblefield’s race was a factor in the decision, that a search would “open up a storm of controversy,” or that the police considered the possibility that it would. The argument served no valid or permissible legal purpose or theory of relevance.
The prosecution’s statements, “to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeal[ ] to racial bias,” under section 745, subdivision (a)(2). The argument invites the listener to consider Stubblefield’s race in weighing the evidence.
The Required Remedy
Section 745, subdivision (e) mandates that if the court finds a violation of subdivision (a), the court “shall impose” one of several enumerated remedies specific to the violation. The subdivision applicable in this case provides, “After a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).)
Disposition
The judgment was reversed and the sentence was vacated. The matter was remanded to the trial court to conduct new proceedings consistent with Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a).
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