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People v. Martinez (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 7, 2025, No. E082657) 2025 WL 429628

Summary: Martinez was charged with grand theft, acting as  contractor without a license, requiring a downpayment in excess of $1,000, and unlawfully receiving payments in excess of the work performed, filed motion to dismiss based on a violation of his rights to a speedy trial. The Superior Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. People appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeal held that:

Andrew v. White (U.S., Jan. 21, 2025, No. 23-6573) 2025 WL 247502

Summary: Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, that Due Process Clause can in certain cases protect against introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence at criminal trials, was a “holding,” for purposes of federal habeas review of state court’s adjudication of merits of prisoner’s federal claim alleging that State introduced irrelevant evidence about her sex life and her failings as mother and wife.

Facts: An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband and sentenced her to death. At trial the State introduced evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant.  Andrew argued in a federal Habeas petition that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals denied the petition because it incorrectly believed that no holding of the Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. However, the Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

People v. Lattin (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 18, 2024, No. D083262) 2024 WL 5153046, at *1

Summary: Lattin contends a gun must be loaded to commit assault with a firearm unless it is used as a club or bludgeon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) He argues that the present ability element of assault cannot be satisfied with an unloaded gun if the defendant is too far from the victim to inflict injury with the firearm as a club or bludgeon. Lattin requested a pinpoint instruction that an assault with a deadly weapon is not committed by a person “pointing an unloaded gun … with no effort or threat to use it as a baton” or “pointing an unloaded gun in a threatening manner” at another person. The trial court declined to give his pinpoint instruction to the jury. Lattin claims this was prejudicial error, and the evidence was insufficient on present ability to support his conviction for assault with a firearm. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, concluding that there is no brightline rule in California that, unless it is used as a club or bludgeon, a gun must be loaded for an assault to be committed. Proof that a firearm was unloaded can be a complete defense to charges of assault, but it is not a complete defense in all circumstances as a matter of law. If ammunition is readily available-as it was in this case—it is a question for the jury whether a defendant with an unloaded gun possesses the means to load the gun and shoot immediately, or whether he is too many steps away from inflicting injury to have the present ability to commit assault.

The Court noted its disagreement with the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions. One of the practice notes for CALCRIM No. 875, the model instruction for assault, states a “gun must be loaded unless used as [a] club or bludgeon” in order “to have [the] present ability to inflict injury.” (Use Note to CALCRIM No. 875.)

People v. Nuno (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2024, No. H051205) 2024 WL 4512214, at *1

Summary:  The issue in this appeal was whether Nuno, under Penal Code section 1172.6, may obtain discovery of material, exculpatory evidence in peace officer personnel records under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) through a motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

Nuno pleaded no contest to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID G. ARIAS, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 10, 2024, No. A164789) 2024 WL 2103781, at *1

Summary: Arias was tried for two counts of sexual abuse committed against J. Doe, a child under 14 years old. During the trial, the defense brought a Batson/Wheeler1 motion challenging the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory strike against a prospective juror who was a Black woman. The trial court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, and the  prosecutor gave three reasons for the strike. The court then denied the motion without any discussion, stating only that it did not “think the challenge was based on racial animus or bias.” The jury convicted Arias and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was improper, because the prosecutor’s reasons for the strike do not withstand scrutiny. The first reason was that the juror would “empathize” more with defense experts than with a prosecution expert because her educational background was similar to that of the defense experts. But the prosecution expert’s educational background was essentially the same as the defense experts’. The second reason was that the juror had concerns about implicit bias and unfairness in the criminal justice system. A recent statute expressly renders such a reason presumptively invalid, the statute does not apply to this case because the jury was selected before its effective date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (e), (i).) But this reason, although facially race-neutral under then-governing law, did not independently justify the strike under the totality of the circumstances. The last reason was that the juror was “pretty opinionated” and might therefore be reluctant to deliberate. This concern was unlikely to have actually motivated the strike, however, because it was not applied to other potential jurors. Applying the Batson/Wheeler framework, the record lacks sufficient evidence on which the trial court could have reasonably relied to accept the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror without further explanation. The  error was structural, and the Court of Appeal reversed.

Adam WALSWORTH, Petitioner, v.The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.C098517; Filed December 20, 2023

2023 WL 8797474 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.), 1

Summary: The Court of Appeal directed the  respondent court to issue an order granting  Walsworth’s motion to dismiss his case. He was denied the statutory right to a speedy trial, and there was no good cause for the undue delay.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS WHITMILL, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 23, 2022, No. B318582) 2022 WL 17883593 

 Summary: Sixty-one-year-old Whitmill appealed the denial of his pretrial motion for mental health diversion of his criminal prosecution. He argued that because he is an honorably discharged veteran who suffers from a severe mental disorder, he meets the eligibility requirements for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court erred when it denied Whitmill’s motion and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion for diversion.