Articles Posted in Uncategorized

People v. Nuno (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2024, No. H051205) 2024 WL 4512214, at *1

Summary:  The issue in this appeal was whether Nuno, under Penal Code section 1172.6, may obtain discovery of material, exculpatory evidence in peace officer personnel records under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) through a motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

Nuno pleaded no contest to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID G. ARIAS, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 10, 2024, No. A164789) 2024 WL 2103781, at *1

Summary: Arias was tried for two counts of sexual abuse committed against J. Doe, a child under 14 years old. During the trial, the defense brought a Batson/Wheeler1 motion challenging the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory strike against a prospective juror who was a Black woman. The trial court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, and the  prosecutor gave three reasons for the strike. The court then denied the motion without any discussion, stating only that it did not “think the challenge was based on racial animus or bias.” The jury convicted Arias and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was improper, because the prosecutor’s reasons for the strike do not withstand scrutiny. The first reason was that the juror would “empathize” more with defense experts than with a prosecution expert because her educational background was similar to that of the defense experts. But the prosecution expert’s educational background was essentially the same as the defense experts’. The second reason was that the juror had concerns about implicit bias and unfairness in the criminal justice system. A recent statute expressly renders such a reason presumptively invalid, the statute does not apply to this case because the jury was selected before its effective date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (e), (i).) But this reason, although facially race-neutral under then-governing law, did not independently justify the strike under the totality of the circumstances. The last reason was that the juror was “pretty opinionated” and might therefore be reluctant to deliberate. This concern was unlikely to have actually motivated the strike, however, because it was not applied to other potential jurors. Applying the Batson/Wheeler framework, the record lacks sufficient evidence on which the trial court could have reasonably relied to accept the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror without further explanation. The  error was structural, and the Court of Appeal reversed.

Adam WALSWORTH, Petitioner, v.The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.C098517; Filed December 20, 2023

2023 WL 8797474 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.), 1

Summary: The Court of Appeal directed the  respondent court to issue an order granting  Walsworth’s motion to dismiss his case. He was denied the statutory right to a speedy trial, and there was no good cause for the undue delay.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS WHITMILL, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 23, 2022, No. B318582) 2022 WL 17883593 

 Summary: Sixty-one-year-old Whitmill appealed the denial of his pretrial motion for mental health diversion of his criminal prosecution. He argued that because he is an honorably discharged veteran who suffers from a severe mental disorder, he meets the eligibility requirements for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court erred when it denied Whitmill’s motion and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion for diversion.

People v. Murphy (Cal. Ct. App., June 30, 2022, No. B306773) 2022 WL 2352782, at *1

Summary:Murphy appealed from his three convictions for second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).).1 Murphy argued that evidence supporting his convictions is insufficient because the prosecution failed to prove he acted with implied malice when, while under the influence of marijuana, he drove his car at nearly 90 miles per hour through a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupants.

The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. There is nocommonly administered and standardized medical test equivalent to the blood alcohol concentration test that accurately determines a person’s level of impairment from lipophilic, psychoactive drugs such as marijuana. However, there was substantial evidence that at the time of the accident Murphy was impaired from using marijuana. There was also substantial evidence that Murphy acted with implied malice both when he smoked marijuana with the intent to drive, and when he drove in a manner that demonstrated a conscious disregard for human life.

People v. Padilla (Cal., May 26, 2022, No. S263375) 2022 WL 1672203, at *1

Summary: In 2016, California voters passed Proposition 57, a measure that amended the law governing the punishment of juvenile offenses in adult criminal court by requiring hearings to determine whether the offenses should instead be heard in juvenile court. Adjudicatng theseoffenses in juvenile court typically results in less severe punishment for the juvenile offender. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 306–307, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 (Lara).)

“New laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656, (Conley), citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, (Estrada).) The retroactivity rule extends to all “nonfinal judgments.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677, (Esquivel).) Proposition 57 “ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely juveniles.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.) “Estrada’s inference of retroactivity applies” to the proposition’s juvenile provisions, making those provisions applicable to all cases in which the judgment was not final when the proposition went into effect. (Lara, at p. 309,.)