Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

People v. Benzler (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 14, 2021, No. C092779) 2021 WL 5902741, at *1

 Summary: Benzler, sentenced in 2014 for offenses he committed when he was 18 years old, appealed the summary denial of his motion for a Franklin hearing1 under Penal Code section 1203.01.2.  Benzler contends he satisfied the eligibility criteria for such a hearing laid out in In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912 (Cook) and did not previously have an opportunity to present evidence related to his status as a juvenile offender. He argued for remand  so he may make a record of this evidence to use in future parole hearings. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

 Facts and background

People v. Williams (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 23, 2021, No. A159914) 2021 WL 5460724, at *1–2

Summary: Williams,  was convicted of murder in 1995 and sentenced to 30 years to life in prison and was released on lifetime parole in 2018. In 2019, he was charged with two misdemeanors, and the district attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole. The  trial court determined that Williams had committed one of the charged offenses and remanded him to prison, the required sanction whenever a court finds that a lifetime parolee has violated parole. (Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h) (section 3000.08(h).)

Williams appealed claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to refer the matter to the parole agency for a written report before ruling on the petition. Under the plain terms of section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) (section 1203.2(b)(1)), a court is required to receive a parole agency’s written report before ruling on a parole revocation petition initiated by a district attorney. There is no implied exception to this requirement when such a petition is filed against a lifetime parolee such as Williams, because the report is not pointless even though a court has no discretion to impose intermediate sanctions.

People v. Schuller (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 10, 2021, No. C087191) 2021 WL 5228434, at *1

Summary: Schuller, shot his long-time friend, W.T., nine times in the head and set the body on fire.  Schuller testified, claiming self-defense, but his trial testimony about suggested he was delusional and hallucinating. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury found Schuller guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was found legally sane and sentenced to a term of 50 years to life.

On appeal, Schuller contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He argues that evidence demonstrates he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self-defense that was not entirely delusional. The Courtnof appeal agreed but find the error harmless.

People v. Davenport (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 10, 2021, No. A161954) 2021 WL 5230876, at *1–3

Summary: In 2007, Davenport pled no contest to second degree murder with a firearm enhancement and was sentenced to  18 years to life. Davenport appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Davenport contends that the   trial court erroneously concluded he failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief by  relying on facts stated in the preliminary hearing transcript in the absence of any stipulation from him that the facts supplied a basis for his plea. The Court of Appeal agreed  and reversed the order summarily denying His  petition and remanded this case for further proceedings.

Facts: Davenport was charged by information with murder (§ 187), alleging he committed the murder “unlawfully and with malice aforethought.” The information included an enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death as well as personal and intentional discharge and personal use of a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).)

People v. Greeley (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 19, 2021, No. H047281) 2021 WL 4889494, at *1

Summary: Greeley was convicted by jury trial of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)).1 The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on probation for three years, and imposed various fines and fees, and restitution. On appeal, Greeley claimed that the three-year term of probation is now unauthorized; and the court should strike the criminal justice administration fee and the probation supervision fee. The court of appeal agreed that the term of probation should be reduced to two years and that the unpaid portions of the criminal justice administration and probation supervision fees should be stricken. The court reversed the judgment and remand with instructions.

Fines and Fees

People v. Cepeda (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 18, 2021, No. B307000) 2021 WL 4843561, at *1

Summary: In 2018, Cepeda pled guilty to carjacking as a second strike, and admitted he sustained a prior serious felony conviction. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years in state prison, which included a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. At the time of Cepeda’s plea and sentence, courts were prohibited from striking serious felony enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

CDCR Recommendation for Resentencing