People v. Turntine (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct., June 24, 2024, No. CA296018) 2024 WL 4143869
Summary: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude expert testimony of toxicologist who testified that all individuals were impaired for purposes of driving at .05% BAC;
Statement of the Case
Clarke v. Gordon (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 12, 2024, No. G062856) 2024 WL 4163081, at *1
Summary: Clarke appeals from the judgment which denied his petition for a writ of mandate which challenged an administrative decision of the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend his driver’s license. An administrative per se (APS) hearing conducted by the DMV following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) resulted in the suspension of his license. Clarke argues the administrative decision must be reversed because (1) the manner in which the DMV conducted the administrative hearing violated due process as determined in California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 532-533, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 608 (DUI Lawyers); and (2) his refusal to submit to either a breath or blood test should be excused. The Court of Appeal agreed with the first contention and reversed the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandate and on remand directed the court to grant the petition.
DMV Hearings and Due Process
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAADI BOLOURCHI, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., June 28, 2024, No. A167289) 2024 WL 3218945, at *1
Summary: Under Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(B), “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood for the purpose of determining the drug content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for” driving while under the influence of a drug in violation of section 23152, subdivision (f). The issue held: If, following a valid arrest for such an offense, a motorist refuses to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained the jury may at the motorist’s ensuing DUI trial draw an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt based on that refusal.
Here, a jury convicted Bolourchi of a DUI offense in violation of section 23152, subdivision (f), and bribing an executive officer. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Bolourchi on three years’ probation, and ordered a jail term of 180 days. On appeal, Bolourchi contends the DUI conviction should be reversed. He argues the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, an instruction that states a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by California’s implied consent statute (§ 23612) may show consciousness of guilt.
People v. Meno (Cal. Ct. App., June 20, 2024, No. D081878) 2024 WL 3063112, at *1
Summary: Meno was convicted of two counts each of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with ordinary negligence (counts 1 and 2; Pen. Code § 191.5, subd. (b)), one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing bodily injury (counts 3; Veh. Code § 23153, subd. (a)), and one count of driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more causing injury (counts 4; Veh. Code § 23153, subd. (b)). The jury also found true that Meno inflicted great bodily injury upon two separate victims as to each of counts 3 and 4. At sentencing, the trial court found that the convictions on counts 3 and 4 were necessarily included offenses of counts 1 and 2. However, due to the associated enhancements, the potential sentence for counts 3 and 4 was greater than that for counts 1 and 2.
The People acknowledged that DUI causing injury was a “lesser” included offense to vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, with either gross or ordinary negligence, and that the convictions for both could not stand simultaneously. The People asked the trial court to vacate counts 1 and 2 and sentence Meno under counts 3 and 4, despite counts 3 and 4 being the necessarily included offenses, because counts 3 and 4 carried a longer potential sentence. Meno asserted that the trial court did not have such discretion and had to vacate the convictions in counts 3 and 4, as well as the attached great bodily injury enhancements.
People v. Barooshian (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2024, No. D081050) 2024 WL 1629664, at *1
Summary: Barooshian was convicted him of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) under a Watson murder theory. In People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, (Watson), the California Supreme Court concluded that a person who kills another while driving under the influence of alcohol may be charged with second degree murder if the circumstances support a finding of implied malice. This is “informally known as a Watson murder.”
At Barooshian’s first trial, the jury did not reach a verdict on a murder charge but convicted Barooshian of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code,2 § 191.5, subd. (a); Veh. Code, §§ 23140, 23152, 23153).
Persiani v. Superior Court, 2024 WL 833043 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.), 1
Summary: A trial court has authority under Penal Code section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(A) to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under the influence.
Persiani was charged in four misdemeanor cases with driving under the influence (Veh. Code § 23152, subd. (a)). While the charges were pending Persiani was found incompetent to stand trial.
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Francisco Andres ALVAREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
2023 WL 9014911 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.), 1
Summary: In Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019) 588 U.S. –––– [139 S.Ct. 2525] (Mitchell), the United States Supreme Court held when a “driver is unconscious and therefore cannot be given a breath test … the exigent-circumstances rule almost always permits a blood test without a warrant.” (Id. at p. 2531 (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)
People v. Suazo (Cal. Ct. Appl., Sept. 19, 2023, No. F082140) 2023 WL 6118736, at *1
Summary: Suazo while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Suazo was convicted of second degree murder; gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; driving under the influence and causing bodily injury; driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more and causing bodily injury; leaving the scene of an accident; and driving on a suspended license. The jury found defendant fled the scene of the crime. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)).
On appeal, Suazo contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder in light of his testimony that he drank alcohol without intending to drive afterward, then drove while unconscious. He also contends the trial court erred in failing to give, or his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request, instructions on unconsciousness and voluntary intoxication with regard to count and the fleeing-the-scene allegation.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VONDETRICK CARR, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 7, 2023, No. E079368) 2023 WL 2820859, at *1
Summary: Carr drove drunk with four children in his car, hitting a pickup truck. One of the children was killed and Carr was convicted of second degree murder. Car was sentenced to a 51 years, 4 months to life in prison.
In 2021, Carr filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition because Carr was not convicted either on a natural and probable consequences theory or under the felony murder rule.
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