San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Bryant (Cal., July 29, 2021, No. S259956) 2021 WL 3201079, at *1

Summary: The 2011 Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; Realignment Act or Act) provides for a period of mandatory supervision after a county jail sentence for eligible defendants. The California Supreme Court assessed the validity of a challenged condition of mandatory supervision  and concluded that discretionary conditions are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (Lent).

Facts: Bryant was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle.  (Pen. Code,1 § 25400, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(6).) The court imposed a split sentence (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)), of two years in the county jail, with the last 364 days to be served at large on mandatory supervision. Over Bryant’s objection, the court imposed the following condition: “Defendant is to submit to search of any electronic device either in his possession[,] including cell phone[,] and/or any device in his place of residence. Any search by probation is limited to defendant[’]s text messages, emails, and photos on such devices.”

People v. Stewart (Cal. Ct. App., July 9, 2021, No. E074907) 2021 WL 2883176, at *1

Summary: Stewart was honorably discharged from the Army in 1976 and suffers from schizophrenia related to his military service. In 1986 and a1992, he was convicted of first degree burglary. In 2001, after being convicted on two counts of spousal battery, he was sentenced, as a third-striker, to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.

In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1170.911 to allow  convicted veterans who suffers from a specified disorder as a result of their military service to petition for resentencing, so that that disorder may be considered as a mitigating factor when imposing a determinate term.

In re Matthew W. (Cal. Ct. App., July 8, 2021, No. A159931) 2021 WL 2850407, at *1

Summary: Matthew W. appealed  from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, in which the court sustained an allegation of assault with a deadly weapon and placed him on probation.

On appeal, Matthew W. contended that  the jurisdictional findings must be reversed because the juvenile court improperly admitted defendant’s pre-arrest statements to police made during a custodial interrogation, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda).

People v. Kasrawi (Cal. Ct. App., June 16, 2021, No. D077139) 2021 WL 2451095

Summary: Kasrawi was stopped and ultimately arrested by a police officer who acted on no more than a hunch. The officer detained  Kasrawi after watching him  cross the street to his legally parked car. The officer later learned that Kasrawi had an outstanding arrest warrant. Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence need not be suppressed.

This case is an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies where a law enforcement officer discovers the defendant’s outstanding warrant after an illegal stop but before a search yields evidence of a crime. Under these limited circumstances, discovery of the warrant  attenuates the taint of the original detention.

Corona v. Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct. App., June 21, 2021, No. A161369) 2021 WL 2525651, at *1

Summary: San Francisco police arrested Corona after he entered a freestanding garage located on the same property as a house. The People charged him with first degree burglary, which applies to the burglary of “an inhabited dwelling house.” (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a).)

Corona argued that an uninhabited outbuilding, such as a detached garage, is not an inhabited dwelling house. The Court of Appeal agreed and found  Corona’s position was consistent with the text and legislative history and over six decades of case law, and our Legislature’s acquiescence in longstanding precedent.

People v. Brewer (Cal. Ct. App., June 7, 2021, No. C089676) 2021 WL 2309551

 Summary:  Brewer  was convicted of second degree robbery, attempted second degree robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm, and sentenced to a determinate term of 63 years. Brewer appealed and contended that  his sentence, which he characterized as the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole imposed on a developmentally disabled person, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17, of the California Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held that:

People v. Esquivel (Cal., June 17, 2021, No. S262551) 2021 WL 2461206, at *1–2

Summary: The California Supreme Court held that the judgment is not final in a  case where defendant is placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of an order revoking probation and imposing sentence. (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25 (McKenzie).)

Therefore, the  Estrada Presumption, that new legislation reducing the punishment for an offense, is  presumed to apply to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (Estrada) applies to cases when a defendant is placed on probation with a suspended sentence that may be appealed if probation is revoked.