San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

Segura v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 2, 2025, No. G065079) 2025 WL 2505320, at *1–2

Summary: Military diversion for misdemeanors

“A defendant charged with a misdemeanor is eligible for diversion if both of the following apply: (1) The defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military.  (2)(A) The defendant may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of their military service.” (Pen. Code, § 1001.80, subd. (b).)

VICTOR MICHAEL ARRIAGA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 29, 2025, No. B340795) 2025 WL 2490639, at *1

Summary: Arriaga petitioned for a peremptory writ of prohibition directing the trial court to grant his motion to dismiss the information for violation of his state speedy trial right and his federal right to due process. Arriaga argued that a 16-year delay between the People’s filing of a felony complaint for wrongful diversion of construction funds in 2007, and his arraignment on the count in 2023, resulted in prejudice to him that outweighed any justification for the delay. The Court agreed and granted Arriaga’s petition.

In 2006, the Los Angeles Building and Safety Department issued a stop-work notice for lack of permits for the construction and because the work Arriaga had performed was not code compliant. An investigation discovered Arriaga was not a licensed contractor in California. The Contractors State License Board (CSLB)referred the case to the district attorney.

People v. Baldwin (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 27, 2025, No. F088265) 2025 WL 2462748, at *1–2

Summary: Baldwin was sentenced to 44 years to life. In 2024, he petitioned for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d))1 and pursuant to People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, (Heard). Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides for recall and resentencing only to those juveniles who were sentenced to an explicit term of life without parole (LWOP). Heard held that section 1170(d) violates equal protection principles to the extent it excludes from relief those juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. The trial court concluded appellant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and denied relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A).

On appeal, Baldwin argues the functional equivalence of LWOP should be determined under the formulation of functional equivalency articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, (Contreras) in the context of the  Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. Contreras analyzed whether sentences of 50 and 58 years to life imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide crimes were functionally equivalent to juvenile LWOP sentences the United States Supreme Court had categorically prohibited in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, (Graham) and were, therefore, unlawful under the Eighth Amendment. Contreras evaluated whether the juvenile sentences at issue provided the type of “ ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” that Graham requires, and ultimately found the sentences unlawful under the Eighth Amendment.

People v. Harlow (Cal. Ct. App., July 5, 2025, No. D084252) 2025 WL 2218129, at *1

Eligibility for mental health eligibility

To qualify for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, criminal defendants must show they are both “eligible” and “suitable” for the program. Mental health diversion must be applied  “as broadly as possible” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149) and accordingly the Legislature amended the statute effective January 1, 2023 to make it much easier for defendants to establish threshold eligibility. They are generally eligible for diversion if within the last five years “they ‘ha[ve] been diagnosed’ with a recognized mental disorder.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento), quoting § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)

People v. Valle (Cal. Ct. App., July 14, 2025, No. 2D CRIM. B338909) 2025 WL 1922434, at *1

Summary: A California prisoner who had a 14-inch by 1-inch hard non-flexible piece of plastic, sharpened to a point, poses a danger to other prisoners and prison officials.  Possession of this lethal weapon in prison is a crime.

Valle is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, appealed his conviction, by jury, of possessing a sharp instrument in prison. (Pen. Code section 4502.) The trial court sentenced him, as a third-strike offender, to a term in prison of 25 years to life. Valle argues that section 4502 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not sufficiently define the term, “sharp instrument.”

People v. Lara (Cal. Ct. App., July 16, 2025, No. F086534) 2025 WL 1970660, at *1

Summary: Lara was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. During pretrial proceedings, defense counsel raised a doubt as to Lara’s competency to stand trial, so the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed a psychologist for evaluation. The psychologist noted “extremely low” intelligence, confusion during two prior police interviews and during the competency evaluation, and scores below the cutoff on all three sections of a test designed to assess incompetence due to intellectual disability. Despite these findings, the psychologist concluded Lara was competent to stand trial. At the competency hearing, the parties submitted on the report without additional evidence, and the trial court found Lara competent to stand trial based on the report. Criminal proceedings resumed.

On appeal, Lara contends the trial court did not follow the procedures for determining his competency to stand trial. He argues there was sufficient evidence of intellectual disability, a type of developmental disability, to require the trial court to appoint “the director of the regional center [for the developmentally disabled] …, or the director’s designee, to examine the defendant[.]” (Pen. Code,1 § 1369, subd. (a)(2).) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court was presented with evidence raising sufficient doubt that Lara was intellectually disabled and was compelled to appoint the regional center director, or the director’s designee, to examine Lara. The court’s failure to do so was prejudicial error, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.