San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

Hernandez v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 24, 2025, No. A173010) 2025 WL 2726476, at *1

Summary: In Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817 (Burgos), the Court of Appeal analyzed Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (g)(2) (Section 1050(g)(2)) which  allows a continuance of a criminal trial when the prosecutor assigned to the case has another trial in progress. A trial is “in progress” only when the judge overseeing the other trial is “available and ready to try the case to conclusion, the court has committed its resources to the trial, and the parties are ready to proceed.” The Court affirms the Burgos test and rejects the People’s attempt to eviscerate it.

Background: Hernandez charged with  sex offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandate to direct respondent San Francisco Superior Court to grant his section 1382 motion to dismiss the information, claiming the trial court erred in granting continuances sought by real party in interest (the People) under Section 1050(g)(2), which provides that “ ‘good cause’ ” for continuing a trial in a case involving specified sex offenses includes the circumstance that “the prosecuting attorney assigned to the case has another trial, preliminary hearing, or motion to suppress in progress in that court or another court.” Here, the trial court erred in concluding the prosecutor was involved in another trial “in progress” within the meaning of Section 1050(g)(2) at the time of two March 2025 continuances.

Angulo v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 16, 2025, No. E085719) 2025 WL 2650050, at *1

Summary: Angulo was charged by the Riverside County District Attorney’s office (the People) with misdemeanor driving under the influence per Vehicle Code sections 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b). Angulo entered a not-guilty plea and requested military diversion per Penal Code section 1001.80. Argulo had been an active member of the United States Marine Corps for five months and he had served five years in the Marine Corps Reserve. The trial court denied defendant’s request finding that he had not served the threshold of active duty for one year or one day of combat to qualify for military diversion. The trial court relied on the Legislature’s intent in enacting Penal Code section 1001.80 and the “Memorandum of Understanding” from the Riverside County Veteran Treatment Center ( MOU), to deny Angulo’s request for pretrial diversion.

Angulo filed a writ of mandate in the appellate department of the superior court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 did not have a one-year requirement of military service to be eligible for diversion. The superior court issued a decision finding that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not contain any time limit for military service and remanded to the trial court for it to reconsider the denial of diversion. The superior court opinion also held that defendant was not entitled to pretrial diversion as a matter of law, but rather, if the trial court found defendant was eligible, the trial court had the discretion to consider whether he was suitable for diversion.

Segura v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 2, 2025, No. G065079) 2025 WL 2505320, at *1–2

Summary: Military diversion for misdemeanors

“A defendant charged with a misdemeanor is eligible for diversion if both of the following apply: (1) The defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military.  (2)(A) The defendant may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of their military service.” (Pen. Code, § 1001.80, subd. (b).)

VICTOR MICHAEL ARRIAGA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 29, 2025, No. B340795) 2025 WL 2490639, at *1

Summary: Arriaga petitioned for a peremptory writ of prohibition directing the trial court to grant his motion to dismiss the information for violation of his state speedy trial right and his federal right to due process. Arriaga argued that a 16-year delay between the People’s filing of a felony complaint for wrongful diversion of construction funds in 2007, and his arraignment on the count in 2023, resulted in prejudice to him that outweighed any justification for the delay. The Court agreed and granted Arriaga’s petition.

In 2006, the Los Angeles Building and Safety Department issued a stop-work notice for lack of permits for the construction and because the work Arriaga had performed was not code compliant. An investigation discovered Arriaga was not a licensed contractor in California. The Contractors State License Board (CSLB)referred the case to the district attorney.

People v. Baldwin (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 27, 2025, No. F088265) 2025 WL 2462748, at *1–2

Summary: Baldwin was sentenced to 44 years to life. In 2024, he petitioned for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d))1 and pursuant to People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, (Heard). Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides for recall and resentencing only to those juveniles who were sentenced to an explicit term of life without parole (LWOP). Heard held that section 1170(d) violates equal protection principles to the extent it excludes from relief those juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. The trial court concluded appellant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and denied relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A).

On appeal, Baldwin argues the functional equivalence of LWOP should be determined under the formulation of functional equivalency articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, (Contreras) in the context of the  Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. Contreras analyzed whether sentences of 50 and 58 years to life imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide crimes were functionally equivalent to juvenile LWOP sentences the United States Supreme Court had categorically prohibited in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, (Graham) and were, therefore, unlawful under the Eighth Amendment. Contreras evaluated whether the juvenile sentences at issue provided the type of “ ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” that Graham requires, and ultimately found the sentences unlawful under the Eighth Amendment.

People v. Harlow (Cal. Ct. App., July 5, 2025, No. D084252) 2025 WL 2218129, at *1

Eligibility for mental health eligibility

To qualify for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, criminal defendants must show they are both “eligible” and “suitable” for the program. Mental health diversion must be applied  “as broadly as possible” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149) and accordingly the Legislature amended the statute effective January 1, 2023 to make it much easier for defendants to establish threshold eligibility. They are generally eligible for diversion if within the last five years “they ‘ha[ve] been diagnosed’ with a recognized mental disorder.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento), quoting § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)